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superiority of “enlightened liberal states” are laughable given that the most 
frequently cited candidates have been among the leading aggressors and 
supporters of unjust regimes around the globe ever since WWII.
The essays by Robert Holmes and Duane Cady, articulating and de-
fending varieties of pacifi sm, are the most philosophically profi cient in the 
book, though both are at their strongest in criticizing those who support 
the possession and deployment of WMD. There is litt le question that a 
pacifi c sett lement of disputes is a moral ideal worth espousing and pursu-
ing, and also, that it is morally correct to advocate a complete abolition of 
WMD—precisely because their destructive force is so powerful and dif-
fi cult to contain. But short of an eﬀ ective coordinated eﬀ ort on the part 
of all nations to disarm, neither Holmes nor Cady provide a convincing 
response to the simple query that confronts the WMD pacifi st; what about 
a situation of self-defense? Are we ever justifi ed in taking up arms against 
an aggressor? If so, are we not also justifi ed in preparing ourselves for 
defense against would-be aggressors, or at least, those who have demon-
strated aggressive intent against us? If so, are we not justifi ed in preparing 
ourselves with weapons that either would actually deter them or would be 
powerful enough to defeat them, e.g., WMD? I see an aﬃ  rmative answer 
to each of these questions, however disturbing it might be.
The problem with the call for disarmament is this: because WMD are seen 
as vital to self-defense given that some states already possess them, then it 
is impractical to expect any nation to unilaterally disarm in the absence of 
international mechanisms that would ensure universal disarmament. Few 
nations will voluntarily abandon their defenses if it means submitt ing to the 
hegemony of others, yet, at present, the dominant nations have not allowed 
any international agency to engineer an eﬀ ective program of universal dis-
armament. This is a further reason to distrust non-proliferation arguments, 
especially when it comes to one of the main regions where political tensions 
and the likelihood of proliferation are the greatest, namely, the Middle East. 
Israel, with its nuclear weapons, its record of aggression against neighboring 
states, its atrocities against Palestinians under occupation, and its virtually 
unqualifi ed support from the U.S., provides Arab and Islamic peoples a le-
gitimate concern for their own safety, and a real incentive to follow the lead 
of Pakistan by acquiring WMD of their own in order to bett er their defenses 
and political leverage. I fault Hashmi for not highlighting this concern, and 
no one should be surprised or indignant if his advice for Islamic countries to 
unilaterally abandon eﬀ orts to acquire WMD falls upon deaf ears.
The Christian Platonism of Simone Weil, edited by E. Jane Doering and Eric 
O. Springsted. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004. Pp. 
xii + 252. $45.00 (hardback); $27.50 (paperback).
PATRICK SHERRY, Lancaster University, England
The work of Simone Weil (1909–1943) is still too litt le known among theolo-
gians and analytic philosophers. I hope that this volume will do something 
to remedy this situation, both because of the quality of the twelve essays 
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in it and because it keys her work into the philosophy of Plato, and shows 
how she propounded a distinctive version of Christian Platonism. I learnt 
a lot from it about Plato, Weil, and the role of philosophy as wisdom.
All the essays are by writers from France or the U.S.A., but they vary in 
scope, readability, and the extent to which they bring in the work of Plato 
himself. There are a few disagreements among the contributors and many 
variations in emphasis. The essays fall roughly into three groups: there 
are two that are wide in scope, three by contrast that are very specialized, 
while the remaining seven grapple in a more general way with her Chris-
tian Platonism, albeit att ending to particular aspects of it, e.g., her materi-
alism or her stress on the role of metaxus (i.e., intermediaries like beauty).
Aft er a short but helpful introduction by the editors, Louis Dupre kicks 
oﬀ  by discussing Plato as the source of Weil’s negative theology, and then 
by bringing out aspects of the latt er, e.g., her treatment of the ‘non-being’ 
of God, our decreation or aﬄ  iction, and our need to submit to the law of 
necessity as an expression of our love of God. He ends by mentioning Susan 
Taubes’ view that Weil’s theology of aﬄ  iction is one of death without resur-
rection, a view which Dupre thinks may need qualifying in the light of the 
later essays in the volume.
All the issues raised in this fi rst essay are discussed by later contribu-
tors, but the point about resurrection is taken up in the concluding essay 
by David Tracy, which forms a pendant to Dupre’s. He sees Weil’s Chris-
tian Platonism as distinguished by a tragic sensibility (whereas the early 
Christian Platonists refl ected too litt le on tragedy). Tracy sees her general 
importance as lying in her reuniting the mystical and prophetic strands in 
Christianity, and comments rightly that it is strange that she was blind to 
the political message of Exodus and the Hebrew prophets.
The three more specialized essays cover a variety of topics. Vance 
G. Morgan discusses how Weil found a religious signifi cance in Greek 
mathematics and geometry, for the notions of mediation, harmony, and 
proportion are sacramental in being analogous to human harmony, love 
of neighbour, and so on, and also in anticipating Christ as Logos and 
Mediator. Florence de Lussy concentrates on Weil’s cryptic comments in 
some of her last notebooks on to on (the real), ending in the position that 
necessity is the basis of reality, and touching on what Plato says in his 
Republic about the arche anupothetos (underived beginning). Martin Andic 
explores the similarities between Weil’s views on freedom, Providence, 
and necessity, and those of Boethius in The Consolation of Philosophy, and 
ends by questioning whether that work is really a Christian one and by 
raising two issues on which Weil might well disagree with its author.
The remaining seven essays form more of a unity in that they all draw 
out aspects of Weil’s distinctive Christian Platonism. Michael Narcy sees 
her as having been deeply infl uenced to some extent in her Platonism by 
her teacher Alain, e.g., in his antidualism and in the importance he ascribed 
to Plato’s myths, but in other ways distancing herself from him. In any 
case, she claimed to have acquired her devotion to Plato by the age of four-
teen. Michael Ross comments on the ‘immanentist’ conception of the good 
in her early and middle years, and claims that despite her disparagement 
of Aristotle he infl uenced her in many ways. Moreover, there was much in 
Plato that she rejected, e.g., the dialogue format, elenchus reasoning, and 
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the Divided Line; and in her thoughts about justice she was far more con-
cerned with release from oppression than with philosopher-kings or the 
analogy between the tripartite soul and tripartite society.
These themes are complemented in Robert Chenavier’s profound con-
tribution, which argues that Weil’s ‘completed’ Platonism included a phi-
losophy of work (she worked for a time in the Renault factory), something 
on which Tracy also touches, and a materialism which could recognize the 
reality of the supernatural. It was Marx’s realization of the importance of 
labour that led her to respect him as an important thinker; and she dis-
agreed with him on his treatment of justice rather than his materialism, 
which she thought was compatible with an authentic spirituality.
The issue of materialism is taken further by Patrick Patt erson and 
Lawrence Schmidt, who, like some other contributors, are anxious to 
distance Weil’s Platonism from the caricatures of Plato that are still prev-
alent. They argue that she emphasized the particularity and materiality 
of Plato’s thought in three ways: her sacramental ontology, especially in 
what she says about beauty; her world-aﬃ  rming epistemology which 
sees God as drawing us to him in and through the world; and her politics 
of engagement with the world. They end by raising a question to which I 
will return, of how she can reconcile the sacramental beauty of the world 
with the sovereignty of might.
Emmanuel Gabellieri also emphasizes the ‘incarnational’ strands of 
Weil’s thought by discussing the role of three metaxus here: world order, 
beauty, and suﬀ ering. He uses Weil’s annotations in her own copy of Pla-
to’s Timaeus to draw out her Trinitarian thinking, and he sees analogies 
between her thought and that of Blondel, as well as diﬀ erences from that 
of recent anti-Platonists like Heidegger and Deleuze.
Another recent thinker with whom Weil can be put in dialogue is Rene 
Girard, and this is the subject of a very rich but diﬃ  cult essay by Cyril 
O’Regan, which perhaps tries to work in too much material. In the last sec-
tion he considers how they both see Christ as a fi gure of countermimesis, 
who breaks the cycle of violence. But en route he discusses her view of evil as 
non-being, her categorization of the Iliad as the poem of violence, her treat-
ment of Prometheus as a fi gure of countermimesis (along with Patroclus in 
the Iliad and the crucifi ed just man in Plato’s Republic), and much else.
Finally in this group of essays, Eric Springsted draws some analogies 
between Weil and St. Augustine, a surprising comparison, given that she 
was almost as critical of him as of Aristotle! Springsted sees her as hav-
ing recovered and reformulated the ‘inner’ sense of Platonism, especially 
through her stress on att ention, and he distinguishes this from Cartesian 
inwardness.
All the essays are substantial contributions, well worth reading. As we 
have seen, some of them are anxious to distinguish Plato, both in himself 
and in Weil’s reading of him, from the fi gure presented to us in many 
philosophy courses in Britain and the U.S.A., at least until recently (not 
to mention the caricature of ‘Greek Philosophy’ still prevalent in much 
theology). Thus some essays play down Plato’s dualism, and O’Regan 
goes a step further in stressing Weil’s reinterpretation of the Orphic ele-
ments in Plato, e.g., by her treating anamnesis not as the recollection of 
past existences but as our att ending to the transcendent dimension of our 
BOOK REVIEWS 115
present life, or by construing Plato’s myths of a last judgement in terms 
of a transcendent viewpoint here and now that judges otherwise than the 
world does.
Scholars of Plato may well have reservations about Weil’s and the con-
tributors’ interpretations of his thought. But I have three more specifi c 
queries.
(1) Aristotle. Many essays bring out her dislike of Aristotle’s thought, 
something which strikes any reader of her works and which she ex-
tended to thinkers infl uenced by him, e.g., Maritain. Some contributors, 
however, maintain, as we have seen, that she absorbed from him more 
than she realized. But do we know how much of Aristotle’s work she had 
actually studied?
(2) A similar question to the one I have asked about Aristotle could 
be asked about St Augustine, another subject of her scathing remarks. 
Springsted admits that, despite her having much in common with his 
Christian Platonism, she had read litt le of his work. Regardless of that 
question, I would want to make a sharper distinction between her views 
on beauty and Augustine’s than Springsted does. Whereas Augustine 
seems at times, especially in the Confessions, to be wary of worldly beau-
ty and fearful of its bewitching its beholders, Weil is much more wel-
coming, for she regards it as an incarnation of God. In terms of the ladder 
of beauty in Plato’s Symposium, Augustine is afraid that people will not 
ascend to Beauty itself, i.e., God, whereas Weil is also interested in traﬃ  c 
downwards, both because of her wide incarnational sense and because of 
her utilization of the creation myth in the Timaeus. As Gabellieri points 
out, she regards both the transcendence and the descending movement of 
the Good as essential in Plato.
Of course, Weil’s analysis of beauty has its limitations. Like many writ-
ers, she thinks of it mainly in terms of order, seen e.g., in mathematics 
and in the impersonal sway of natural laws, and is less appreciative of 
its sensual radiant character, what Aquinas called “claritas.” She is not 
interested too in beauty’s relation to other aesthetic concepts, but rather 
to other grand concepts like truth and goodness. But this takes me to my 
third and most serious query.
(3) Providence. In his Simone Weil: Utopian Pessimist David McLellan 
notes that whereas Israel’s God was present and active in history, Weil’s 
God is absent from it, and is only present in nature through the iron laws 
of necessity, so that she was suspicious of the ideas of providence and fi nal 
causes. He asks how necessity can both be the face of an indiﬀ erent and 
impersonal God, and yet also the veil of a loving God. It seems to me that 
she lacks any sense of God working through natural laws to achieve par-
ticular purposes, partly because she associates the idea of personal provi-
dence with the common Christian tendency, as she sees it, to treat God as 
the counterpart of the Roman emperor who adjusts things according to his 
benevolent caprices, and partly because she seems to have been unfamil-
iar with the idea of secondary causality.
Patt erson and Schmidt see something of this problem when they ask 
at the end of their essay how Weil’s faith in the sacramental beauty of the 
world as an incarnation of God can be reconciled with her ‘recognition 
of the absolute sovereignty of might’ (p. 90), but respond weakly that the 
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weight of her argument, discernible in the rest of her writings, relativizes 
the oﬀ ensiveness of necessity. Andic too sees the problem, but seems to 
think that the only alternatives are Weil’s conception of necessity or else 
Providence ‘intervening’ in events (p. 167), thus failing to do justice to 
Aquinas’ and others’ teaching on secondary causes.
So there is work still to be done. But these essays push forward our 
understanding of Weil, and show that she was an important thinker, 
whose work should be read more widely.
